The Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi, presided over by Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary, delivered its order on 1 February 2023 in Cr.M.P. No. 1826 of 2021, quashing the criminal proceedings against Sh. Venkatram Mamillapalle, CEO and MD of Renault India Pvt. Ltd. The case arose from a complaint filed by Mrs Rachna Kumari, who alleged that she was supplied a Renault Duster RXS 85PS BSIV instead of the ordered Duster RXS 110PS BSIV. Based on her complaint, Deoghar Town P.S. Case No. 285 of 2021 was registered under Sections 406 and 420 IPC.

During the hearing, the petitioner argued that he had no direct dealings with the complainant, as sales were independently managed by authorised dealers. He contended that there was no allegation of inducement or misrepresentation against him, and therefore, the essential ingredients of cheating or criminal breach of trust were absent. The dealership agreement and invoices showed that the supply was made by Absolute Auto Pvt. Ltd., Renault Dhanbad, without any involvement of the CEO. The State, however, maintained that liability could arise since the order was forwarded to Renault’s headquarters, and the role of the CEO could only be determined during investigation.

In its judgment, the Court examined the applicability of Priyanka Srivastava v. State of U.P. and clarified that the guidelines requiring affidavits under Section 156(3) CrPC apply only when a complainant invokes the jurisdiction of the Magistrate, not when the Court itself forwards a complaint. More importantly, the Court reiterated the settled principle that vicarious liability of company directors cannot be automatically imputed unless there is evidence of active involvement or a statutory provision. Referring to precedents such as Sunil Bharti Mittal v. CBI and Shiv Kumar Jatia v. State (NCT of Delhi), the Court held that no role was attributed to the petitioner in the alleged supply of a different car model.

Concluding that continuation of proceedings against the CEO would amount to a gross abuse of process, the Court quashed the FIR and criminal prosecution against Mamillapalle. The Criminal Miscellaneous Petition was accordingly allowed.

Cr.M.P. No. 1826 of 2021

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In Branch Manager, National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Jharia Devi & Ors., the High Court of Jharkhand considered the scope of an insurer’s liability in a motor accident compensation claim involving allegations relating to the validity of the driver’s licence and breach of policy conditions. The appeal arose from an award passed by the Motor Vehicles Accident Claims Tribunal, Pakur, directing the insurer to pay compensation of ₹38,55,560 along with interest to the family of a deceased police employee who lost his life in a road accident caused by a rashly driven Scorpio vehicle.

According to the facts placed before the Tribunal, the deceased was returning home on his motorcycle when he was hit by the offending vehicle, resulting in fatal injuries. An FIR was registered against the driver of the Scorpio, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed under various provisions of the Indian Penal Code relating to rash and negligent driving. The claimants, being the family members of the deceased, sought compensation on the ground that the deceased was the sole earning member of the household and was employed with the Jharkhand Police. The offending vehicle was admittedly insured with National Insurance Company Limited at the time of the accident.

Before the High Court, the insurer challenged the award principally on the ground that the owner of the offending vehicle had failed to conclusively establish the validity of the driver’s licence, thereby amounting to a breach of policy conditions under Section 149 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The insurer further contended that the compensation awarded by the Tribunal was excessive and inconsistent with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in relation to deduction of personal expenses, consortium, and interest.

Rejecting the appeal, the High Court observed that in third-party motor accident claims, the burden lies upon the insurer not merely to allege breach of policy conditions but to establish wilful and fundamental breach on the part of the insured. Relying extensively upon the decisions of the Supreme Court of India in National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut and Nirmala Kothari v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd., the Court reiterated that an insured owner is only expected to verify whether the driver possesses a licence that appears genuine on its face and is competent to drive the vehicle. Unless the insurer demonstrates that the owner knowingly permitted a person with a fake or invalid licence to operate the vehicle, liability towards third parties cannot ordinarily be avoided.

The Court further held that the Tribunal had correctly assessed the compensation and that no illegality existed in the award of interest or amounts granted under conventional heads such as funeral expenses and loss of consortium. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, and the insurer was directed to satisfy the award within six weeks.

The judgment is significant for reaffirming the protective framework underlying third-party motor accident compensation law in India. By placing a high threshold upon insurers seeking to evade liability on technical grounds, the Court reinforced the principle that compensation statutes must be interpreted in a manner that safeguards the rights and interests of accident victims and their dependants.

M.A. No. 24 of 2018

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In Sangita Devi v. Sanjeet Kumar Singh, the High Court of Jharkhand reaffirmed the established judicial principle that, in matrimonial transfer proceedings, greater weight must ordinarily be accorded to the convenience and circumstances of the wife. The matter arose through a transfer petition filed under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure by the petitioner-wife seeking transfer of a matrimonial suit instituted by her husband from the Family Court at Hazaribagh to the Family Court at Ranchi.

Before the Court, the petitioner submitted that she was residing separately in Ranchi along with her two minor children, both of whom were entirely dependent upon her care and supervision. It was further contended that she lacked an independent source of income and faced considerable hardship in travelling repeatedly to Hazaribagh, situated at a distance of more than ninety kilometres from Ranchi, for the purpose of attending court proceedings. In contrast, the husband was stated to possess sufficient financial means and would not suffer comparable inconvenience if the proceedings were transferred to Ranchi. Despite the valid service of notice, the opposite party did not appear before the Court to contest the petition.

While adjudicating the matter, the High Court emphasised the settled legal position that courts must remain sensitive to the practical difficulties faced by female litigants in matrimonial disputes. The Bench observed that transfer petitions filed by wives deserve liberal consideration to prevent undue hardship, particularly where childcare responsibilities, financial dependence, and logistical constraints significantly affect their ability to participate effectively in legal proceedings. The Court reiterated that, in such circumstances, the convenience of the wife must ordinarily prevail over that of the husband.

Accordingly, the Court allowed the transfer petition and directed that the matrimonial proceedings pending before the Principal Judge, Family Court, Hazaribagh, be transferred to the Principal Judge, Family Court, Ranchi. Necessary directions were also issued for the immediate transmission of the case records to the transferee court.

The decision reflects the judiciary’s continuing recognition of substantive access to justice in matrimonial litigation and reinforces the broader principle that procedural rules must be applied in a manner that accommodates the social and economic realities faced by women litigants.

Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 107 of 2022

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In Pratap Ekka v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., the High Court of Jharkhand reaffirmed the constitutional principle that an adult individual possesses the autonomy to choose their partner and decide with whom they wish to reside. The matter came before the Court through a criminal writ petition filed by Pratap Ekka seeking protection of his relationship with Sadrika Pradhan, an adult woman whose father opposed their association. The proceedings were revived pursuant to directions issued by the Supreme Court of India, which instructed the High Court to reconsider the matter in light of the statement made by the woman before a Judicial Magistrate.

During the proceedings, the Court personally interacted with the petitioner, the woman concerned, and her father. Documentary proof in the form of the matriculation certificate established that Sadrika Pradhan was born on 26 August 1999 and was therefore a major. The Court also noted that she unequivocally expressed her desire to continue her relationship with the petitioner and stated that she wished to accompany him voluntarily. The petitioner, who was likewise a major, informed the Court regarding his educational background and present involvement in his family’s business.

The father of the woman raised concerns regarding the petitioner’s financial stability and prospects; however, he did not dispute that his daughter had attained majority. After considering the statements of all parties, the Bench observed that once an individual attains majority and is capable of making an informed decision, no unlawful restraint can be imposed upon their personal choice. The Court emphasised that the wishes of an adult woman must be accorded primacy, particularly where her decision is made voluntarily and without coercion.

Accordingly, the High Court directed that no obstruction or interference should be caused by the respondent father or any other person in permitting Sadrika Pradhan to join the company of the petitioner. The Officer-in-Charge of Jagarnathpur Police Station was further instructed to ensure that no unlawful hindrance was created against either party. With these observations, the writ petition was disposed of.

The judgment serves as another significant reaffirmation of the constitutional guarantees of personal liberty, dignity, and decisional autonomy under Article 21 of the Constitution. By recognising the independent agency of consenting adults in matters of personal relationships, the Court reiterated the judiciary’s consistent position that societal or familial disapproval cannot override an adult individual’s freedom of choice.

W.P.(Cr.) (HB) No. 486 of 2021

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In Software Freedom Law Centre, India v. State of Jharkhand, the High Court of Jharkhand examined the legality and procedural transparency surrounding temporary internet shutdowns imposed by the State government during periods of public unrest. The Public Interest Litigation was filed by the Software Freedom Law Centre, India, seeking disclosure and judicial review of government orders dated 7 February 2022, 10 June 2022, and 11 June 2022, through which internet services had been suspended in several districts of Jharkhand. The petitioner also sought strict enforcement of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India concerning internet shutdowns and freedom of expression.

The State defended its actions by contending that the suspensions were imposed only during emergent situations involving threats to public order and safety. According to the government, the shutdowns were temporary measures intended to prevent the spread of rumours and misinformation that could potentially lead to violence and disruption of law and order. The State further submitted that the actions were taken under the powers conferred by the Temporary Suspension of Telecom Services Rules, 2017, and were revoked shortly after normalcy was restored.

While the High Court did not find the temporary suspension of internet services itself to be illegal in the facts of the case, it expressed concern over the State’s failure to publish the shutdown orders on official websites promptly. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India and Foundation for Media Professionals v. Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir, the Court reiterated that transparency and public accessibility of such orders are essential safeguards in a constitutional democracy. Consequently, the Bench directed the State Government to upload all previous internet suspension orders within forty-eight hours and to strictly comply with the procedural safeguards prescribed by the Supreme Court in future instances of internet shutdowns.

The ruling is significant in reinforcing the principle that although the State may temporarily restrict internet access in situations involving public emergency or public safety, such measures remain subject to constitutional scrutiny, procedural accountability, and the requirement of transparency.

W.P.(PIL) No. 3947 of 2022

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In Ajit Kumar Thakur v. Union of India & Anr., the High Court of Jharkhand examined the limits of prolonged incarceration under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) while deciding a bail application filed by a former General Manager of Central Coalfields Limited (CCL). The case arose from allegations that members of the extremist outfit TPC were extorting levies from coal transporters and contractors operating in Jharkhand’s coal belt. The prosecution alleged that Ajit Kumar Thakur had facilitated meetings between TPC operatives, contractors, and local stakeholders, thereby aiding the collection and distribution of extortion money. The investigation was later transferred to the National Investigation Agency (NIA), which charged the appellant under various provisions of the UAPA.

Before the Court, the appellant argued that his actions were merely administrative and connected to maintaining the smooth functioning of mining operations in Naxal-affected areas. He further contended that no incriminating recovery had been made from him and that similarly placed co-accused had already been granted bail. The NIA, however, maintained that the appellant played a central role in the alleged extortion network and that the statutory bar under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA prevented the grant of bail.

The High Court ultimately allowed the appeal and granted bail to the appellant. While acknowledging the seriousness of the allegations, the Bench observed that there was no direct accusation linking the appellant to any terrorist act and that the evidence primarily suggested his role as a facilitator in operational coordination. The Court also gave considerable weight to the fact that the appellant had remained in custody since 2019 and that the trial, involving 185 witnesses, was unlikely to conclude in the near future. Relying upon precedents such as Union of India v. K.A. Najeeb and Sudesh Kedia v. Union of India, the Court reiterated that statutory restrictions under the UAPA cannot override the constitutional guarantee of personal liberty indefinitely. The judgment therefore stands as an important reaffirmation of the principle that prolonged detention without timely trial cannot become a substitute for punishment under anti-terror legislation.

Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No. 999 of 2019

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In a deeply sensitive case involving a 100% visually impaired rape survivor, the High Court of Jharkhand refused permission for termination of a 28-week pregnancy after a medical board warned that the procedure posed serious risk to the survivor’s life, while simultaneously directing the State to provide ₹10 lakh compensation, rehabilitation, medical care, and long-term support.

The writ petition was filed anonymously as “A” to protect the identity of the survivor, who had allegedly been subjected to repeated sexual assault, including gang rape by close family members. The Court was informed that an FIR had earlier been registered at Nagri Police Station under provisions of the Indian Penal Code and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act against her brother and uncle.

Appearing for the petitioner, counsel submitted that the survivor was completely blind, lived in extreme vulnerability, and lacked institutional support. The petition sought immediate shelter, constitution of a medical board to examine the feasibility of terminating the pregnancy, and appointment of female medical and social support personnel for her care.

Pursuant to earlier directions of the Court, Rajendra Institute of Medical Sciences constituted a multidisciplinary medical board comprising specialists in gynecology, neonatology, psychiatry, medicine, anesthesia, and radiology. The board concluded that the pregnancy had advanced to approximately 26–28 weeks and that termination at that stage would involve significant medical risk. It further noted that no congenital abnormality had been detected in the fetus and that termination beyond 24 weeks was impermissible under the amended Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act except in narrowly defined circumstances.

Justice Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi observed that while the Court was acutely conscious of the physical, psychological, and emotional trauma suffered by the survivor, it could not ignore the statutory limitations under the MTP Act or the medical opinion that termination could endanger her life.

Relying on Supreme Court precedents including Suchita Srivastava v. Chandigarh Administration and Z v. State of Bihar, the Court emphasized that reproductive rights include both the right to terminate and the right to carry a pregnancy to full term, but termination is legally permissible only within the framework laid down by statute.

While declining permission for abortion, the Court issued an extensive set of welfare directions. The Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi was directed to ensure proper nutrition, medicines, medical supervision, and safe delivery arrangements for the survivor. The Court further ordered that she be placed in a suitable rehabilitation centre operated either by the State Government or under Union Government schemes.

Recognizing the gravity of the survivor’s condition and vulnerability, the Court directed the State Legal Services Authority to ensure payment of ₹10 lakh compensation under the victim compensation framework. The amount was ordered to be deposited in a nationalised bank account opened in the survivor’s name.

The Court also directed authorities to consider disability pension benefits for the survivor and recommended establishment of a dedicated rehabilitation centre in Ranchi for victims facing similar circumstances, noting the absence of such facilities in the state capital.

Describing rape as “a crime not only against a woman but against humanity,” the Court concluded that the welfare of both the survivor and the unborn child had to remain the paramount consideration while balancing statutory limitations and medical realities.

W.P. (Cr.) No. 421 of 2022

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In a significant order concerning tribal forest rights and administrative inaction, the High Court of Jharkhand directed district authorities in Lohardaga to process a long-pending claim filed by Gram Sabha Salaiya seeking recognition of Community Forest Rights (CFR) and Community Forest Resource Rights (CFRR) under the Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act.

The petition was filed through Gram Pradhan Binod Munda alleging that despite submission of a formal application in October 2019, the authorities had failed to take any decision regarding the community’s claim over forest land measuring approximately 5670.94 acres situated in Salaiya village of Kisko block in Lohardaga district.

According to the petition, the Forest Rights Committee of the Gram Sabha had prepared and submitted the application under Sections 3(1)(b) and 3(1)(c) of the Forest Rights Act, which recognize the rights of forest-dwelling communities over traditional forest resources and community forest management. The application was submitted before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Lohardaga, who functions as the Chairperson of the Sub-Divisional Level Committee responsible for processing such claims.

The Gram Sabha argued before the Court that despite repeated representations to various authorities, including the Deputy Commissioner and the Chief Secretary of Jharkhand, no progress had been made on the claim, compelling the community to approach the High Court.

Appearing for the State, counsel submitted that it was unclear whether the application had already been processed under the statutory framework but assured the Court that necessary steps would be taken in accordance with law if not already completed.

Justice Rajesh Shankar, while refraining from examining the merits of the claim itself, directed the Sub-Divisional Level Committee headed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Lohardaga to process the Gram Sabha’s application if it had not already been processed. The Court further directed that thereafter the District Level Committee headed by the Deputy Commissioner must take an appropriate decision in accordance with law.

The High Court ordered that the entire exercise be completed within three months from the date of receipt of the order, and disposed of the writ petition with these directions.

W.P.(C) No. 1858 of 2023

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The writ petition was filed by Chithu Pradhan, a resident of Gumla district, seeking compensation under the Jharkhand State Victim Compensation Scheme. According to the petition, his mother and sister were killed in an incident that led to registration of Raidih Police Station Case No. 08 of 2025 under Section 103(1) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Sections 3 and 4 of the Jharkhand Prevention of Witch (Daain) Practices Act.

The petitioner informed the Court that applications for compensation had already been submitted before the Jharkhand State Legal Services Authority as well as the District Legal Services Authority, Gumla, but no decision had yet been taken.

Hearing the matter, Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary observed that since the petitioner had already approached the legal services authorities for victim compensation, the matter should be processed without further delay.

The Court directed the petitioner and his wife to personally appear before the District Legal Services Authority, Gumla within two weeks with a fresh copy of their application and supporting documents. The DLSA was further instructed to dispose of the compensation claim within four weeks thereafter under the Jharkhand State Victim Compensation Scheme, 2019.

The Court also ordered immediate communication of the direction to the District Legal Services Authority, Gumla for compliance, before disposing of the writ petition.

W. P. (Cr.) No. 83 of 2026

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In an important ruling on procedural safeguards and personal liberty, the High Court of Jharkhand set aside non-bailable warrants and proclamation proceedings issued against members of a Ranchi-based family in a vigilance investigation, holding that courts cannot mechanically authorize arrests without recording satisfaction that the accused are deliberately evading arrest.

The petition was filed by Sheela Kumari, Puja Sinha, and Rahul Kumar Sinha challenging orders passed by the Special Judge, CBI, Ranchi in a vigilance case registered by the State Vigilance Bureau.

The petitioners approached the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure seeking quashing of the trial court’s order issuing warrants of arrest against them. During the pendency of the matter, proclamation proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C. were also initiated, prompting the petitioners to seek amendment of their plea.

Before the Court, counsel for the petitioners argued that the mandatory legal requirement for issuing a non-bailable warrant under Section 73 Cr.P.C. had not been fulfilled. It was contended that warrants can be issued only when the accused is an escaped convict, a proclaimed offender, or a person accused of a non-bailable offence who is actively evading arrest. According to the petitioners, there was no material before the lower court to conclude that they were evading arrest.

Reliance was placed on several judicial precedents, including the Supreme Court decision in State through C.B.I. v. Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, where the Court emphasized that arrest warrants cannot be issued merely to aid police investigation and that judicial discretion must be exercised carefully before curtailing liberty.

Justice Anil Kumar Choudhary accepted the contention of the petitioners and observed that neither the requisition submitted by the investigating officer nor the impugned orders recorded any satisfaction that the accused persons were absconding or avoiding arrest.

The Court stressed that issuance of a non-bailable warrant directly interferes with an individual’s personal liberty protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. Referring to the Supreme Court’s observations in Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, the High Court reiterated that courts must act with extreme caution before authorizing coercive measures.

Holding that the Special Judge had failed to apply judicial mind and had issued the warrants mechanically, the High Court quashed both the order issuing non-bailable warrants and the subsequent proclamation proceedings under Section 82 Cr.P.C.

At the same time, the Court clarified that the interim protection earlier granted to the petitioners from coercive action stood vacated upon disposal of the petition, while granting liberty to the Anti-Corruption Bureau to continue the investigation in accordance with law.

Cr.M.P. No. 4155 of 2019

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In a strong rebuke to police excesses, the High Court of Jharkhand directed the State to pay enhanced compensation of ₹5 lakh to Anil Kumar Singh, who was illegally detained, assaulted, and confined for three days by police officials in Latehar district.

The Court noted that the State itself admitted that Singh had been mistakenly taken into custody by police personnel from Garu Police Station and was subjected to custodial torture despite there being no material against him. He was eventually released after the police realized that he was not the person they intended to apprehend.

Justice Ananda Sen observed that the conduct of the police officials was arbitrary and amounted to a grave misuse of power. The Court found the initially sanctioned compensation of ₹50,000 grossly inadequate considering the unlawful detention and physical torture suffered by the petitioner.

Emphasizing that the police had “taken law into their hands,” the Court enhanced the compensation to ₹5 lakh and directed the State to make payment within two weeks. Importantly, the Court further ordered that the amount paid by the State must subsequently be recovered from the police officials responsible for the illegal custody and torture within two months.

The Court also recorded that a chargesheet had already been filed against Sub-Inspector Ranjit Kumar Yadav and other police personnel involved in the incident. Directions were additionally issued to inform the Accountant General and the Director General of Police, Jharkhand, regarding compliance with the order.

W.P.(Cr.) No. 509 of 2022

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In a significant ruling protecting the financial rights of officials performing higher responsibilities in public office, the High Court of Jharkhand held that a person who functioned as the Chairman of the Jharkhand Real Estate Regulatory Authority was lawfully entitled to receive the salary and benefits attached to that post, even though he had only been “nominated” and not formally appointed as Chairman.

The case arose from a writ petition filed by Ranjeet Kumar Choudhary, a retired Member of JHARERA, challenging the State Government’s decision to recover ₹5,47,984 from his House Rent Allowance after retirement. The State claimed that the amount represented “excess payment” made during the period when Choudhary functioned as Chairman of the Authority.

The petitioner had originally been appointed as a Member of JHARERA. However, after the post of Chairperson fell vacant in December 2022, the Governor of Jharkhand nominated him to discharge the functions of Chairman until either a regular appointment was made or he attained superannuation. Acting under this notification, Choudhary assumed charge as Chairman and continued to perform all duties associated with the office until his retirement on 25 January 2024.

During this tenure, he received salary equivalent to the pay scale of the Chief Secretary rank, which is the scale prescribed for the Chairperson of JHARERA. After his retirement, however, the State authorities concluded that since he had only been “nominated” and not substantively appointed as Chairman, he was not entitled to that scale. Consequently, the alleged excess amount was recovered from his HRA dues.

Rejecting the State’s reasoning, Justice Ananda Sen observed that the petitioner had in fact discharged every responsibility of the Chairperson and had functioned fully in that capacity. The Court held that once an officer is entrusted with and performs the duties of a higher office, he cannot be denied the salary attached to that office merely because the arrangement was temporary or officiating in nature.

The Court categorically ruled that there was no illegality in paying Choudhary the Chairman’s scale during the period he actually served as Chairman. Declaring the recovery illegal, the Court directed the State to refund the deducted amount within three weeks from receipt of the order.

At the same time, the Court clarified an important distinction regarding retirement benefits. Since Choudhary’s tenure as Chairman was only temporary and not a substantive appointment, his pensionary and retiral benefits would continue to be calculated on the basis of the substantive post he held permanently — namely, Member of JHARERA.

With these observations, the writ petition was allowed, reaffirming the principle that public authorities cannot deny legitimate remuneration for duties actually performed, particularly after retirement.

W.P.(S) No. 69 of 2025

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In a significant judgment concerning long-pending service regularisation disputes in constituent colleges, the High Court of Jharkhand directed the State Government and Ranchi University to formally regularise the services of a lecturer who had served continuously for nearly thirty-eight years and to grant him all consequential benefits, including revised pay scales and retiral dues.

The judgment was delivered on 1 December 2025 by Justice Deepak Roshan in W.P. (S) No. 7360 of 2017, filed by Ravi Bhushan Prasad Amar, a lecturer in Mathematics at Mandar College, Ranchi.

The petitioner approached the Court seeking regularisation of his services and extension of benefits flowing from the 5th, 6th, and 7th Pay Revisions, contending that despite rendering uninterrupted service since 1985, the authorities had continued to treat him as an employee drawing salary in an unrevised scale.

According to the case record, the petitioner had initially been appointed as a temporary Lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Mandar College on 29 June 1985 and joined service on 5 July 1985. Subsequently, the college was taken over by Ranchi University in 1986 and converted into a constituent college. A scrutiny committee constituted by the University later verified the appointments of employees working in the institution at the time of takeover, and the petitioner’s name appeared in the official records.

The controversy primarily revolved around a government notification dated 18 December 1989 through which the services of teaching and non-teaching employees of the newly taken-over colleges were absorbed. The petitioner’s name appeared in the notification under the Mathematics Department. Despite this, disputes regarding the legality and implementation of such absorptions continued for decades and became the subject matter of extensive litigation before the High Courts and the Supreme Court.

The Court noted that throughout the petitioner’s service career, the University had continued to issue transfer and posting orders in his favour, thereby recognising him as part of the institutional framework. He was even transferred to B.S. City College, Bokaro, before later being reposted to Mandar College.

The judgment further records that several judicial and administrative exercises were undertaken over the years to resolve disputes relating to absorbed employees of constituent colleges, including proceedings before the Justice S.C. Agarwal Commission and later the Justice S.B. Sinha Commission constituted pursuant to directions of the Supreme Court of India.

The petitioner had approached the Justice S.B. Sinha Commission seeking adjudication of his claim and seniority dispute. However, the Commission refrained from deciding the matter on merits and observed that the petitioner was free to pursue remedies before the appropriate forum.

Meanwhile, despite continuing in service until his superannuation on 31 January 2023, the petitioner remained deprived of revised UGC pay scales and retiral benefits. The University defended its position by claiming that the petitioner’s regularisation remained disputed and had not been conclusively accepted by the commissions constituted for examining such claims.

Rejecting the stand of the respondents, Justice Deepak Roshan observed that the petitioner’s absorption under Notification No. 181/C dated 18 December 1989 had never been rescinded and therefore continued to hold the field. The Court emphasised that the petitioner had served continuously for almost four decades and that the authorities had consistently taken work from him while simultaneously denying him the status and benefits of a regular employee.

The Court relied upon several earlier decisions dealing with similarly situated lecturers and constituent college employees. It referred to previous rulings affirming that the 1989 absorption notification represented a valid governmental decision and that universities possessed the authority to regularise and confirm services of employees working in constituent colleges.

Justice Roshan observed that once the petitioner had continuously discharged his duties from 1985 till retirement, the respondents could not lawfully deny him revised pay scales or pensionary benefits merely on technical grounds relating to formal absorption. The Court held that withholding such benefits after extracting nearly thirty-eight years of service was unsustainable in law.

Allowing the writ petition, the High Court directed the concerned authorities to issue a formal order recognising the petitioner’s entitlement as a regular employee and to extend all consequential service and retirement benefits, including arrears arising from the 5th, 6th, and 7th Pay Revisions. The Court granted the respondents twelve weeks to comply with the directions.

The judgment is likely to hold significance for several similarly situated teachers and staff members of constituent colleges in Jharkhand whose claims regarding absorption, pay revision, and pensionary benefits have remained unresolved despite long years of service.

W.P. (S) No. 7360 of 2017

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In a significant order dealing with organised crime, terror financing, and the stringent bail restrictions under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, the High Court of Jharkhand refused to grant bail to an alleged associate of gangster Aman Sahu, holding that the materials collected during investigation disclosed a strong prima facie case involving channelisation of extortion money, illegal arms dealings, and use of shell companies for laundering criminal proceeds.

The order was passed on 1 December 2025 by a Division Bench comprising Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Ambuj Nath in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 448 of 2025, filed by Shankar Yadav against the Union of India through the National Investigation Agency.

The appeal challenged the order of the Special NIA Court, Ranchi, which had rejected the appellant’s prayer for bail in connection with a high-profile terror and extortion case arising out of the Balumath violence incident of December 2020.

The case traces its origins to a violent attack near Tetariakhad Colliery in Latehar district on 18 December 2020, when armed assailants allegedly set vehicles on fire, fired indiscriminately upon civilians and police personnel, and left behind threatening pamphlets directed at coal transporters and mining companies. During the incident, four trucks and a motorcycle were burnt, while several civilians sustained injuries. Investigators recovered explosive remnants, spent cartridges, and pamphlets allegedly linked to associates of gangster Pradeep Ganjhu.

Subsequent investigation revealed an alleged criminal conspiracy involving notorious gangster Aman Sahu, Sujit Sinha, Pradeep Ganjhu, and several associates accused of carrying out extortion and terror activities in Jharkhand’s coal belt. Owing to the gravity of the allegations, the Ministry of Home Affairs transferred the investigation to the National Investigation Agency, which re-registered the matter as RC-01/2021/NIA/RNC.

Before the High Court, counsel for the appellant argued that Shankar Yadav had been falsely implicated nearly four years after the incident despite not being named in the FIR or initial charge sheets. It was submitted that the appellant was a businessman running legitimate enterprises and that the ₹1.3 crore cash recovered from his residence represented business proceeds connected with real estate transactions and flat bookings. The defence further contended that the firearms recovered from his premises were licensed and that other co-accused persons had already secured bail from the High Court in related proceedings.

The NIA, however, strongly opposed the plea, describing the appellant as a crucial financial operative within Aman Sahu’s criminal network. According to the prosecution, searches conducted at the appellant’s premises in Bhagalpur led to recovery of huge amounts of unexplained cash, firearms, live ammunition, mobile phones, electronic devices, and documents allegedly exposing a large-scale money laundering and extortion racket.

The investigation, as detailed before the Court, allegedly revealed that the appellant had created and operated shell firms to circulate extorted funds under the guise of business transactions. The NIA claimed that one firm, M/s Kiran Enterprises, had been opened in the name of Akash Sahu—brother of gangster Aman Sahu—while another concern, Om Sai Trading and Construction Company, belonged to the appellant himself. Financial scrutiny allegedly showed repeated suspicious transactions between the two entities without corresponding legitimate commercial activity.

The Court also took note of allegations that the appellant had used extortion proceeds to invest in real estate projects, including “Maa Sharda Enclave Apartments” at Tupudana, Ranchi, later renamed “Savitri Shankar Enclave.” Investigators alleged that possession of the property had been taken through forged documents and that signatures used in certain agreements appeared fabricated.

Further incriminating material, according to the NIA, emerged from forensic analysis of mobile phones and electronic devices seized during the searches. Investigators claimed that chats, virtual numbers, voice recordings, and call records demonstrated close communication between the appellant and members of the Aman Sahu gang regarding procurement of arms, ammunition, and operational activities conducted from jail. The agency also alleged that the appellant had attempted to intimidate witnesses through conference calls made from prison.

After examining the supplementary charge-sheet and materials produced during investigation, the High Court observed that the allegations against the appellant were substantially different from those against co-accused persons who had previously been granted bail. The Bench held that the evidence collected by the NIA indicated a deep and active nexus between the appellant and the criminal syndicate.

The Court noted that although the appellant attempted to justify the large cash recovery through business records, the declared cash-in-hand in his income tax filings was grossly disproportionate to the ₹1.3 crore recovered from his residence. The judges also found that the bank transactions between firms linked to the appellant and Akash Sahu strengthened the prosecution’s suspicion that extortion funds were being disguised as legitimate business income.

Holding that a strong prima facie case existed, the Bench ruled that the statutory embargo under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA stood attracted. Under this provision, bail cannot ordinarily be granted if the Court finds reasonable grounds for believing that accusations against the accused are prima facie true.

The High Court consequently refused to interfere with the Special NIA Court’s order rejecting bail and dismissed the appeal, while observing that the trial was already progressing. The ruling once again highlights the stringent approach adopted by courts in cases involving allegations of terror financing, organised extortion networks, and unlawful activities prosecuted under the UAPA framework.

Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 448 of 2025

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“Mere Marital Discord Is Not Cruelty”: Jharkhand High Court Rejects Husband’s Divorce Plea After Finding Allegations Against Wife Unsubstantiated

In a significant matrimonial ruling reaffirming the limits of “mental cruelty” under Indian family law, the High Court of Jharkhand dismissed a husband’s appeal seeking divorce from his wife of nearly three decades, holding that ordinary marital disagreements and unsupported allegations of infidelity could not be treated as sufficient grounds for dissolving a marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

The judgment was delivered on 1 December 2025 by a Division Bench comprising Justice Rongon Mukhopadhyay and Justice Arun Kumar Rai in First Appeal No. 279 of 2019, filed by Shashi Prakash Mishra against his wife Nisha Mishra. The appeal challenged the decision of the Family Court at Ranchi, which had earlier refused to grant a decree of divorce.

The dispute arose from a marriage solemnized on 4 July 1995 at Hazaribagh according to Hindu rites and customs. The husband, an agricultural engineer who later worked at various institutions including BIT Mesra and MGIRI Wardha, alleged that his marriage had been troubled from the very beginning. According to him, the wife had disclosed on the very first night of marriage that she was in love with another man and had unwillingly entered into the marriage due to pressure from her family. He further claimed that she remained emotionally distant, behaved aggressively towards his family members, and repeatedly left the matrimonial home without consent.

Over the years, the husband alleged, the relationship deteriorated further. He accused the wife of humiliating him, neglecting him after he suffered a serious road accident in 2001 that left him physically disabled, and maintaining inappropriate relations with certain men known to the family. He also stated that the constant mental stress adversely affected his professional career and eventually compelled him to leave Ranchi permanently in 2006. Claiming that the marriage had become unbearable and had effectively collapsed, he sought divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion.

The wife, however, painted a completely different picture before the Court. She denied all allegations of infidelity and cruelty, asserting instead that she herself had been subjected to harassment and dowry-related taunts by her husband and in-laws. According to her, she endured humiliation and mistreatment for years in the hope that the marriage would improve. She maintained that she had never willingly abandoned the marriage and even expressed readiness before the Court to continue living with her husband.

While examining the appeal, the High Court undertook a detailed discussion of the legal meaning of “mental cruelty” in matrimonial law. The Bench referred extensively to landmark Supreme Court rulings including Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, both of which recognise that cruelty cannot be assessed through rigid formulas and must instead be judged in light of the parties’ social background, conduct, temperament, and circumstances.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the husband had failed to establish conduct serious enough to legally constitute cruelty. The judges observed that many of the incidents narrated by the husband reflected ordinary wear and tear of married life rather than exceptional acts causing deep mental agony. The Bench also noted that the couple had three children during the course of their marriage, a fact which contradicted the husband’s claim that the marital relationship had been emotionally broken from the very beginning.

The Court was particularly critical of the husband’s allegations regarding the wife’s character and alleged affairs. It held that these accusations were unsupported by reliable evidence and appeared reckless in nature. The testimony of witnesses produced by the husband did not convincingly establish any misconduct on the part of the wife. Instead, the Court observed that such allegations themselves could amount to humiliation and emotional suffering for the respondent.

On the issue of desertion, the High Court held that the legal ingredients necessary to prove abandonment were absent. The Bench pointed out that it was in fact the husband who had left Ranchi in 2006, leaving the wife and children behind. The Court accepted the wife’s contention that she had been compelled to leave the matrimonial home due to the hostile environment and repeated allegations levelled against her.

Concluding that the Family Court had correctly appreciated both the facts and the law, the High Court refused to interfere with the earlier decision and dismissed the appeal. The judgment stands as an important reaffirmation that matrimonial courts must distinguish genuine legal cruelty from ordinary domestic conflict and that unsupported accusations against a spouse cannot by themselves become a ground for divorce.

First Appeal No. 279 of 2019

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In a significant reaffirmation of judicial consistency, the High Court of Jharkhand dismissed a batch of writ petitions concerning service-related claims of teachers from Garhwa district, holding that the controversy had already been conclusively settled by an earlier Division Bench judgment.

The matter was decided by Justice Deepak Roshan on 1 December 2025 in W.P. (S) No. 5345 of 2016, W.P. (S) No. 5347 of 2016, and W.P. (S) No. 6204 of 2016. The petitions were filed respectively by Virendra Kumar Pal, Markandey Tiwari, and Bipin Kumar Chaubey against the State of Jharkhand and various education authorities.

The petitioners had approached the Court challenging actions of the State and the educational establishment authorities relating to their service conditions and appointments. The respondents included the State Government, the Secretary of the School Education and Literacy Department, the Director of Primary Education, and the District Establishment Committee of Garhwa.

At the very outset of the hearing, counsel appearing for the petitioners, Parth Jalan, candidly submitted before the Court that the legal issue involved in the present batch of cases had already been adjudicated against similarly situated employees in L.P.A. No. 388 of 2013 along with analogous matters, reported in 2017 SCC OnLine Jhar 755. Since the controversy stood settled by a binding Division Bench precedent, it was fairly conceded that no substantive issue survived for fresh adjudication.

Taking note of this submission, Justice Deepak Roshan observed that nothing further remained to be decided in the writ petitions. Consequently, all the petitions were dismissed in light of the earlier Division Bench ruling. The Court also directed that any pending interlocutory applications stood closed.

The judgment is concise yet procedurally important because it reiterates the binding nature of precedents under the doctrine of stare decisis. By refusing to reopen an issue already settled by a coordinate Division Bench, the Court reinforced judicial discipline and certainty in service jurisprudence. The order also reflects the practice of judicial economy, where courts avoid unnecessary reconsideration of matters conclusively decided in earlier authoritative rulings.

The case highlights how precedents in service matters, particularly those concerning government appointments and educational establishments, continue to govern subsequent litigation involving similarly placed employees unless distinguished on facts or overturned by a higher forum.

W.P. (S) No. 5345 of 2016

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In Balwan Singh v. Union of India & Others (2025 SCC OnLine Jhar 3682), decided on 1 December 2025, the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi, per Justice Deepak Roshan, dismissed a writ petition filed by a CISF constable challenging disciplinary action that resulted in reduction of his pay. The petitioner had sought quashing of the revisional order dated 14.11.2014 passed by the Director General, CISF, which had affirmed the appellate order dated 13.09.2013, and had also prayed for consequential monetary benefits.

The matter arose out of departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner in February 2013, when a charge memo was served upon him on 21.02.2013. He submitted his reply within time, following which an inquiry officer was appointed. The inquiry was conducted under Rule 36 of the CISF Rules, 2003, and after submission of the inquiry report on 27.04.2013, the petitioner filed his written defence. Upon consideration of the material on record and the petitioner’s response to the second show cause, the Commandant, CISF, CTPS Chandrapura, Bokaro, imposed a major penalty on 14.05.2013. The punishment entailed reduction of pay to the minimum stage in the pay band of Constable (GD) for a period of three years, with denial of increments during that period and postponement of future increments; the suspension period from 18.02.2013 to 18.03.2013 was directed to be treated as such for all purposes.

Aggrieved, the petitioner preferred an appeal on 01.07.2013 before the Deputy Inspector General, CISF, Patliputra. The appellate authority, by order dated 13.09.2013, modified the punishment by reducing it to a one-stage reduction in pay (from ₹7830 + GP ₹2000 to ₹7540 + GP ₹2000) for three years with cumulative effect, while retaining the directions regarding denial of increments during the period and postponement of future increments. A revision petition filed thereafter on 23.07.2014 was dismissed on 14.11.2014 by the Director General, CISF, thereby affirming the modified punishment, which led to the present writ proceedings.

Before the High Court, the petitioner contended that the appellate and revisional authorities had failed to properly consider his reply to the show cause notice and the statements of witnesses, which, according to him, indicated that the incident occurred in a spur of the moment. It was further argued that he had been unfairly singled out and made a scapegoat while others allegedly involved were not proceeded against. The respondents, on the other hand, submitted that the inquiry had been conducted strictly in accordance with procedure, that the petitioner had been afforded full opportunity at every stage, and that the punishment, in fact, stood mitigated in appeal. Reliance was placed on State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj (2020) to emphasise that the scope of judicial review is confined to the decision-making process and does not extend to reappreciation of evidence.

Upon consideration of the record, the Court found that the petitioner’s principal contention of being made a scapegoat had not been raised at the appropriate stages, namely in his reply to the second show cause or in the memorandum of appeal. The Court further observed that the inquiry had been conducted after granting full opportunity to the petitioner, with examination of witnesses, and there was no procedural irregularity or violation of principles of natural justice. The disciplinary authority had taken into account the petitioner’s defence before imposing the penalty, and the appellate authority had applied its mind to the matter and reduced the severity of punishment. The revisional authority had thereafter rightly upheld the modified order.

Reiterating the settled position on judicial review, the Court held that it does not sit as an appellate authority over departmental proceedings and is concerned only with the fairness of the procedure and the existence of some evidence supporting the findings. In the absence of perversity, procedural illegality, or violation of natural justice, no interference was warranted. Finding no error either on merits or in the decision-making process, the Court dismissed the writ petition, declined to grant any relief, made no order as to costs, and closed any pending interlocutory applications.

W.P.(S) No. 5079 of 2015

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A Technical Objection with Practical Consequences: Jharkhand High Court on the Form of RERA Appeals

The courtroom was not grappling with the merits of a builder-buyer dispute that day. Instead, the focus shifted to something far more procedural, yet equally decisive. Before the Jharkhand High Court, in a matter between Katyani Developers & Construction and Rajesh Kumar, the central question was not who was right, but whether the appeal itself had been correctly framed.

The appellant, a builder, had approached the High Court under Section 58 of the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, challenging an order of the Jharkhand Real Estate Appellate Tribunal. On the surface, the filing appeared routine. But the respondent raised a preliminary objection that went to the root of the case’s maintainability. According to the respondent, Section 58 restricts appeals to the High Court only on grounds similar to those in Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code, which governs second appeals. If that were so, the present case, styled as a miscellaneous appeal, was fundamentally misplaced.

This objection reframed the entire discussion. Was this, in substance, a second appeal requiring the framing of substantial questions of law? Or was it something distinct, owing to the unique scheme of the RERA Act?

Counsel for the appellant pushed back firmly. The argument was simple but precise. The foundation of a second appeal under the CPC lies in the existence of a “decree.” Yet, the original order passed by the RERA adjudicating authority, it was argued, does not qualify as a decree under Section 2(2) of the CPC. If the starting point itself is not a decree, the appellate chain cannot be forced into the mould of first and second appeals as understood in civil procedure. The Tribunal’s order, though executable as a decree, does not transform into one in character.

To strengthen this position, reliance was placed on a consistent line of reasoning adopted by several High Courts, including Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, and Allahabad. These courts had previously declined to treat such appeals as second appeals in the strict procedural sense.

When the matter came before the bench of Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary, the Court engaged with this distinction carefully. It acknowledged that while the RERA framework borrows certain procedural aspects from civil law, it does not fully replicate the CPC structure. The Court observed that the mere fact that an order is executable as a decree does not make it one. Execution is a matter of enforcement, not classification.

The analysis then turned to the Jharkhand High Court Rules, 2001. Here, the Court found a practical answer to the procedural confusion. The rules clearly categorize different types of appeals, and miscellaneous appeals are narrowly defined, largely confined to specific statutory contexts like motor accident claims or workmen compensation matters. Appeals arising from tribunals, where no specific category is prescribed, fall under a different classification, namely A.C. (Single Bench).

This clarification proved decisive. The Court concluded that the present appeal was not maintainable as a miscellaneous appeal. However, instead of dismissing it outright, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. The appellant was granted liberty to correct the nomenclature and reclassify the appeal under the appropriate category within a week.

What might seem like a minor technical correction carries broader implications. The decision reinforces that procedural law is not merely about rigid labels but about correctly situating a case within the legal framework. At the same time, it signals that courts are willing to prioritize substantive justice by allowing rectification where possible, rather than shutting the door on technical grounds.

In the end, the case serves as a quiet reminder to practitioners that in appellate litigation, how you frame your case can be just as important as the arguments you make.

M. A. No.448 of 2024

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The Jharkhand High Court dismissed a husband’s appeal seeking divorce on grounds of cruelty and desertion, holding that the allegations did not meet the legal threshold required under matrimonial law. The case arose from a long-standing marital dispute between Shashi Prakash Mishra and his wife, Nisha Mishra, married in 1995. The husband alleged that his wife had misrepresented her background, refused marital obligations, behaved abusively, and maintained questionable relationships, further claiming that she neglected him after a disabling accident. The wife, however, denied all accusations and countered that she had been subjected to dowry harassment and ill-treatment by her husband and in-laws, forcing her to live separately.

After examining the evidence and testimonies, the Court observed that the allegations of cruelty were largely unsubstantiated and amounted to normal wear and tear of marital life rather than legally actionable cruelty. It further noted that reckless accusations of infidelity without proof could not be accepted and, in fact, reflected adversely on the husband’s claims. On the issue of desertion, the Court held that there was no evidence of wilful abandonment by the wife and pointed out that the husband himself had left the matrimonial home. Upholding the Family Court’s earlier decision, the High Court concluded that no valid grounds for divorce were established and dismissed the appeal, reaffirming that mere marital discord cannot justify dissolution of marriage under law

First Appeal 279 Of 2019 Repaired

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In a significant step towards enforcing prison reform, the Jharkhand High Court has initiated a suo motu Public Interest Litigation, W.P. PIL No. 2273 of 2026, titled Court on its own Motion versus The State of Jharkhand. The bench comprising the Chief Justice M. S. Sonak and Justice Rajesh Shankar passed the order dated 13 April 2026.

The case arises from directions issued by the Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition Civil No. 1082 of 2020 through its judgment dated 26 February 2026. The Supreme Court had emphasized the need for active judicial monitoring to ensure effective implementation of its earlier directions concerning prison conditions and reforms, particularly referencing its 2018 decision in In Re Inhuman Conditions in 1382 Prisons.

Acting in compliance with these directions, the Jharkhand High Court has registered this petition as a continuing mandamus to oversee the establishment, functioning, and expansion of Operational Correctional Institutes or OCIs within the state.

The Supreme Court’s framework mandates a multi tier monitoring mechanism. It requires all High Courts to supervise compliance, while directing every State and Union Territory to constitute a Monitoring Committee for OCI management. This committee is to be headed by the Executive Chairman of the State Legal Services Authority or a nominee, including a former High Court judge. Its members must include the Home Secretary or a nominee not below the rank of Additional Secretary, and a senior Prisons Department officer not below the rank of Deputy Inspector General.

The Monitoring Committee is tasked with ensuring compliance with court directions, overseeing OCI functioning and expansion, facilitating timely transfer of eligible prisoners from closed prisons, and periodically reviewing implementation challenges.

In line with these directives, the Jharkhand High Court has ordered the State to constitute the Monitoring Committee within four weeks. Additionally, the Court has directed the Home Secretary to file a compliance affidavit before the next hearing. This report must confirm the constitution of the committee, provide details on the current status and functioning of OCIs in Jharkhand, and assess the feasibility of establishing more than one OCI in the state.

The Court has scheduled the next hearing for 11 June 2026 at 2:15 pm and directed the registry to immediately supply relevant case documents to the State’s counsel, Mr. Piyush Chitresh, who appeared as Assistant Counsel to the Advocate General.

The order reflects a broader push for institutional accountability through continuous judicial oversight, ensuring that constitutional mandates on prison reforms translate into tangible outcomes on the ground.

W.P.(PIL) No. 2273 of 2026

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